### Post-Silicon Debugging of Many-Core Systems by Identifying Execution Paths Through Constraint Refinement

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## **Extracted paths**

Traces represent multiple paths which share a set of states that do communications



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## Outline

- Introduction
- Overview of our method
- Transaction-level state machine
- Transaction-level backtracking and debug
  - Path generation
  - Bug localization
- Experimental results
- Conclusions

## Introduction

- Complexity of modern SoCs is increasing
   Number of cores is increasing (over 1,000 !)
   Cores themselves maybe very complicated
- Communication among cores becomes more and more complicated

Multiple concurrent transactions

- Bugs may escape from pre-silicon to prototype or even to final system
- Post-Silicon debug is becoming a major task
   Takes more than 50% of overall design time

# **Our Approach**

- Focus on functional bugs
- Consider communications among cores
  - Can be observed by monitoring communication channels (buses, NoCs, ...)
- Link between chip transactions and highlevel transactions
  - Assuming transaction-level design exists
  - Post-silicon debug with transaction-level analysis
- Backtrack in transaction-level design
   Transaction-level path generation
   Formal path analysis and constraint refinement

## **Overview of Our Method**



#### **Post-Silicon Debug Flow**

- Extract transaction-level behavior of modules from their TLM codes.
- 2) Instrument the hardware by adding monitoring modules and trace buffers to save transaction information during system operation.



- 3) Extract the transaction-level Run the system until a crash or failure state is reached or an error is detected.
- 4) Read the contents of the trace buffers and also the last state of the modules.
- 5) Run the debug process to backtrack in transaction-level states of the modules to find the bug(s).

## **Transaction Monitoring**

#### Extract transaction information from signal events

- General data
  - Initiator, target, command(read/write)
- Application-specific data
- Monitoring circuit generation requires
  - Communication protocol
  - Application-specific data
- Trace buffer(s) contents

initiator ID	target ID	target Addr	Command	Data	Ş
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## **Transaction-Level State Machine**

- For each module (core) extract one state machine
   System consists of several concurrent state machines
- □ States correspond to high-level behavior of module
- Transition between states happens when a transaction is received and a pre-condition holds
- Pre-conditions (or guard expressions) only depend on internal variables/signals
- Transition between two states may result in an action that is initiating (sending) a transaction



### **TLSM Example**



## **TLSM Formal Definition**

#### □ TLSM = (Ei, Eo,S, s0, G, T, A)

- Ei is set of input events (transactions)
- Eo is set of output events (transactions)
- □ S is set of states
- s0 is the initial state and belongs to S
- G is set of guard conditions
- T is transition function: Ei\*G\*S -> S
- □ A is action function: Ei\*G\*S -> Eo

## **TLSM Extraction**

- Determine the functions for extraction process
  - Functions dealing with state variable(s) and also handling incoming and outgoing transactions
- Convert the TLM/SystemC/C++ code to a pure C code that represents the functionality dealing with state variable(s) and also the transactions
- Extract the TLSM states and their corresponding C code as a function
  - Abstract all the internal functionality
- Abstract the extracted code for the backtrack and analysis process

## **Some TLSM Extraction Details**

- Some functionality of the modules are abstracted
  - User can define which parts to be abstracted
  - Some variable values may be replaced with new symbolic variables
    - All assignments to those variables are ignored
    - User may specify some constraint on the abstracted variables
  - Some functions may be abstracted as uninterpreted functions
    - All the code inside those functions are ignored
    - User may specify some constraint on return value of the abstrated functions

## Some TLSM Extraction Details (2)

- C++ libraries (for example STL) are converted to their equivalent C codes
  - Also introducing bounds for some data structures such as array, list, ... that can be unbound in their original form
- Considering specific coding style for using SystemC/TLM constructs to ease automation

Currently manual process (automatic program in development) Need to decide which functions to be abstracted away

## **TLSM Extraction Example**

#### case ST\_RELEASING:

```
if (counter != locked_list_size) {
   packet.src_dest =
        locked_list[counter];
   packet.cmd = DL_FREE;
   packet.data = 0;
   send_packet(packet);
   counter++;
}
```

else {

```
if (ub\_cond\_size == 0) {
 state = ST_IDLE;
 counter = -1;
 succ_list_size = 0;
 pred_list_size = 0;
 locked_list_size = 0;
else {
 state = ST_WAIT_TO_LOCK;
 k = some_func1();
 counter = locked_list_size;
}
ub_cond_size = 0;
```

## **TLSM Extraction Example (2)**

struct packet\_info main\_process\_ST\_RELEASING\_simple();

```
struct packet_info main_process_ST_RELEASING_abs(char g1, char g2)
   { // g1: mp_counter != locked_list_size // g2: ub_cond_size == 0
 struct packet_info packet; packet.cmd = CMD_NONE;
 assert (state == ST_RELEASING);
 if (g1) {
  packet.src_dest = nondet_int(); packet.cmd = DL_FREE;
  packet.data = 0; \}
 else {
  if (g2) { state = ST_IDLE; }
  else { state = ST_WAIT_TO_LOCK; }
 }
 return packet;
```

## **Debug Process**

- Debugging is performed using:
  - The trace file
  - The extracted TLSM(s)
  - The last state of the target module(s)
- Two phase process
- Phase 1: path generation (for transaction-level backtracking)
  - Find bugs according to transaction behavior of the system
- □ Phase 2: path solver (bug localization)
  - Find cause of the bugs in more details according to the abstracted functionality

## **Path Generation**

#### Path generation is exercised using:

- □ The trace file
- □ The extracted TLSM(s)
- The last state of the module(s)
- Beginning from the last state
- Following the observed transactions, find:
  - Possible (potential) previous states
  - Corresponding guard expressions
- Generate the output for path solver process to see if the path is actually feasible or not

### **Extracted paths**

#### Represent multiple paths which share a set of states



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### **Path Generation Example**

```
rec_rep_2.cmd = DL_REPORT;
state = ST_DEADLOCK_DETECTION;
st_dd_g1_1 = 1;
st_dd_g1_2 = 1;
dl_wgh_g1_1 = nondet_uchar() % 2;
...
ret 00 =
  main_process_ST_DEADLOCK_DETECTION_abs(st_dd_g1_1);
assert(ret_00.cmd == DL_CALL);
X.X.4
```

```
assert(state == ST_DEADLOCK_DETECTION);
```

rec\_rep\_1.cmd = DL\_REPORT;

## Path Solver

- For each generated path consider the actual functionality to find the bug
- Using BMC to find the values of internal variables
- □ Interactive process
- User should specify
  - Start and end of path (length of path)
  - Constraints on internal variables and the possible initial values (if known!)
  - Additional assertions to be checked
- Abstraction of functionality is necessary because of limitations of BMC

## Path Solver Example

tileID = 16;

- state = nondet\_uint() % (ST\_DEADLOCK\_RESOLUTION+1); \_\_ESBMC\_assume(state >= ST\_IDLE && state <= ST\_DEADLOCK\_RESOLUTION);
- weight\_up = nondet\_uint();
- weight\_dn = nondet\_uint();
  - \_\_ESBMC\_assume(weight\_dn != 0);
  - \_ESBMC\_assume(weight\_up <= weight\_dn);

```
state = ST_DEADLOCK_DETECTION;
```

```
g_is_deadlock_detection_active = 1;
```

## Path Solver Example (2)

\_ESBMC\_assume(mp\_counter != succ\_list\_size);

ret\_00 =

```
main_process_ST_DEADLOCK_DETECTION_simple(rand
om_val_00);
```

```
assert(ret_00.cmd == DL_CALL);
```

```
_ESBMC_assume(ret_00.src_dest == 11);
```

```
__ESBMC_assume(ret_00.data == 268439554);
```

```
assert(weight_dn != weight_up);
```

----

```
assert(state != ST_DEADLOCK_DETECTION);
```

## **Case Study**

- A Distributed Deadlock Detection and Resolution algorithm
- Several modules access shared resources
- Each module locks its required resources, does some (dummy) operation and releases them
- If locking is unsuccessful, a deadlock may have happened
- One of the modules begin deadlock detection and resolution

## **Deadlock Detection Overview**

- Node 1 is the initiator of the detection and resolution process
- Solid lines represent query command to ask locked resources of each core
- Dashed lines show responses that are sent from each core to the initiator node (node 1)
- Finally, core 1 can determine from information from all other cores whether a deadlock is happened and how to (efficiently) resolve it



## **TLSM of Case Study**

- Three concurrent processes are considered for TLSM extraction
  - Controlling state machine process
  - Lock/free handling process
  - Deadlock detection/handling process
  - Overall about 620 lines of code
- TLSM consists of:
  - □ 8 states
  - 121 transitions
  - □ 22 different guard expressions

## **Experimental Setup**

- Modules with deadlock detection and resolution capability are implemented at transaction level
- Whole system consists of 25 modules in a 5\*5 mesh NoC
- □ Nirgam NoC simulator is used for the network
- Whole system is simulated for 1000 cycles and transactions are logged during simulation
- Path generation process is implemented as a C++ program
- For bug localization, the ESBMC tool is used as our BMC engine and Z3 as SMT solver

# **Description of Bugs (1)**

#### □ Bug 1:

- When the release request is sent to the module that has started the deadlock detection, it did not work.
- Incorrect sequence of transactions (observed and used in the path generation process):
  - sequence of sending and receiving release request by the module that has started the deadlock detection and resolution
- Constraint found during path analysis:
  - after sending the release command, the state does not change to the state for releasing the resources
- □ Cause of the bug:

This case has not been implemented

# **Description of Bugs (2)**

#### □ Bug 2:

- beginning the deadlock resolution process before getting all the required information from other modules.
- Incorrect sequence of transactions (observed and used in the path generation process):
  - receiving a deadlock query response from a module after sending a deadlock resolution command to another module
- Constraint found during path analysis:
  - One of the internal variables for detecting the end of process becomes incorrectly more than 1
- □ Cause of the bug:

2 responses are received incorrectly from a module

## **Description of Bugs (3)**

□ Bug 3:

not beginning the deadlock resolution procedure.

- Incorrect sequence of transactions (observed and used in the path generation process):
  - one of the modules does not respond to the initiator module (a missing transaction)
- Constraint found during path analysis:

overflow of one of the internal lists!

Cause of the bug:

□ A problem in the implementation of the network!

### **Experimental Results**

	Transaction- level debug		C-based BMC		SMT solver				
Bug	#modules	#messages	#paths	#assigns	#vcc	#funcs	#preds	#assumes	Runtime (s)
1	1	13	1	1014	31	273	737	1228	1.5
2	2	21	2	1797	47	483	1288	2156	2.9
3	5	31	2	3791	70	994	2597	4384	7.9

## Conclusions

- We have presented a transaction-level postsilicon debug method that employs:
  - Transaction-level design information
  - Transaction information that is extracted during the system run
- We have introduced the transaction-level state machine and a mechanism to backtrack in transaction-level states
- Furthermore, we have used a mechanism to find constraints on internal variables of modules to pinpoint the bug

## Thank You!

#### **Questions?**